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Recent years have seen a dramatic rise of public interest in the phenomenon of 
conspiracy theories. Events such as the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, the 7 July 
2005 London bombings, the 2008 financial crisis or the flu pandemic have all provoked a host of 
often outlandish claims of cover-ups, hidden agendas and secret plots, capturing public 
imagination throughout the world. Although the internet is the main medium for the transmission 
of such claims, conspiracy theories receive regular coverage in the mainstream media. 
Conspiracy explanations about climate change, 9/11, the death of Lady Diana or even 
speculation about the sinister activities of the ‘Israel lobby’ have all featured in the mainstream 
press in the UK in recent years. Also, forty years after the assassination of John Kennedy or the 
Apollo 11 moon landing, claims that these events were the result of some secret plot or deception 
continue to receive coverage on network television and terrestrial channels. It is therefore 
unsurprising that recent opinion polls consistently show that a substantial proportion of people in 
the western world readily admit to believing in some form of conspiracy theory (see Byford, 
2011 for a recent review). 
Public fascination with conspiracy theories is, however, not limited to the US or Western 
Europe. Globally, conspiracy theories persist as a popular means of articulating the opposition to 
the forces of international capitalism, globalisation, America’s military and political supremacy 
and the more general rise of the transnational political order. There are some regional variations 
though. In Eastern Europe, and especially Russia, anti-westernism, a staple ingredient of populist 
politics in the region, continues to be based on the idea of a sinister western conspiracy intended 
to undermine or destroy local culture and traditions. In many Islamic countries, from Egypt to 
Malaysia it is the idea of a vast Jewish plot that permeates the rhetoric of politicians with 
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disturbing frequency, while in sub-Saharan Africa, conspiracy theories about the nature and 
origins of AIDS are so widespread that they have become an important obstacle to the success of 
public health campaigns.   
Given this apparent rise in the popularity of conspiracy theories, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that in recent years social psychologists too have become more attentive to this 
phenomenon. In the late 1980s, in the concluding remarks to the edited volume Changing 
conceptions of conspiracy, Carl Graumann (1987, p.245) noted that, even though conspiracy 
theories are a topic of ‘intrinsic psychological interest’, there was, at that point, no substantial 
body of psychological research devoted specifically to their study. With the exception of the 
attempts to explore conspiratorial antisemitism in terms of psychoanalytic theory (e.g. Ackerman 
and Jahoda, 1950,  Bettelheim and Janowitz, 1950), and some generic research on causal 
inference (see Billig, 1978, Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983), conspiracy theories had been left, 
almost completely, to the mercy of disciplines such as history and the other social sciences. 
However, in the quarter of a century since Graumann’s remarks, social psychologists have taken 
steps towards ‘reclaiming’ conspiracism from the other disciplines. The steady stream of 
empirical studies (a significant number of which were conducted in the UK) has explored 
psychological factors that might account for people’s susceptibility to conspiracist thinking, thus 
signalling a gradual emergence of a distinct social psychology of conspiracy theories.i 
The present chapter offers an assessment of this growing field of research through the 
prism of Michael Billig’s seminal writing on conspiracy theories published in the late 1970s and 
1980s (Billig, 1978, 1987, 1988, 1989). In Fascists: A Social Psychological View of the National 
Front, Billig (1978) examined conspiracy theories as one of the central pillars of fascist 
ideology, which underpins the fundamental ‘logic’ of the fascist’s worldview. In a small number 
of essays published in the subsequent decade, Billig explored further the social psychological 
aspects of conspiracism in the ideology of both the far-right (Billig, 1989) and the far-left (Billig, 
1987), but also considered some important methodological issues concerning the study of 
conspiracy theories as a form of ideological explanation (Billig, 1988).   
In spite of its originality and continuing relevance, this body of work is largely neglected 
in contemporary literature on conspiracy theories, including that written by social psychologists. 
In fact, the only reference to Billig’s work in social psychological studies of conspiracy beliefs 
published over the past ten years is an article on Serbian conspiracy culture, which we co-
3 
 
authored in 2001 (Byford and Billig, 2001). What is more, this study tends to be mentioned 
merely as an illustration of conspiracism’s global appeal, without any engagement with the 
substance of the argument or the specific approach to conspiracy theories advocated therein.  
In the forthcoming discussion, I will examine the conceptual, theoretical and 
methodological issues that might account for why the emerging social psychology of conspiracy 
theories continues to ignore Billig’s writing. As will become apparent, this has everything to do 
with experimental social psychology’s continuing reluctance to engage with concepts that have 
been at the core of much of Michael Billig’s work over the past forty years, namely ideology and 
argumentative rhetoric. Furthermore, I will argue that, at a time when conspiracism is said to be 
on the rise, there is much to be gained from a return to Billig’s pioneering and original writing on 
the topic, and from steering social psychology of conspiracy theory in a direction different to 
where it is currently heading. 
 
The emerging ‘social psychology of conspiracy theories’ 
 
In the writing of Michael Billig, conspiracy theories are considered as a feature of 
extreme political views and an ideology that ‘remains just beyond the mainstream of everyday 
thinking’ (Billig, 1988, p.201). In the last two decades, however, there has been an important 
transformation in the public perception of conspiracy theories. The conspiracy mentality is no 
longer regarded as the prerogative of ‘extremists’, but as a form of everyday social explanation 
and an increasingly common way of accounting for some of the key political, and some would 
argue existential challenges of the modern age: secrecy in politics, increase in surveillance and 
threat to privacy, the rise in the power of transnational corporate bodies and their diminished 
accountability, the widespread sense of weakened personal agency, and so on (Knight, 2000, 
Fenster, 2008). In other words, conspiracy theories are said to have migrated from the margins to 
the centre ground of politics, and as opinion polls consistently remind us, are to be found among 
the general population, often in quite significant proportion.  
The assumption about the widespread popularity of conspiracy theories underpins the 
recent social psychological research on the topic. Given that opinion polls clearly show that not 
everyone believes in conspiracy theories, the attention has focused squarely on identifying 
factors that distinguish believers from non-believers. Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999, p.646) 
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captured the essence of this strand of research when they wrote that ‘history may well be a 
conspiracy, but apparently only certain types of people endorse this view’. The goal has been, 
therefore, to uncover who these ‘certain types’ are, and to create a ‘profiling model of 
conspiracist individuals’ (Swami et al., 2010, p.751). Also, research has focused on identifying 
perceptual or cognitive deficits which might lead individuals to embrace conspiracy 
explanations, in line with Arie Kruglanski’s contention that conspiracy theories might be 
underpinned by ‘cognitive illusions, paralleling the widely documented perceptual illusions’ 
(Kruglanski, 1987, p.220). 
Research looking at differences between believers in conspiracy theories and sceptics 
typically consists of lengthy questionnaires which are distributed to a sample of the population, 
often university students. These questionnaires are composed of different measures, or scales, 
one of which usually assesses the participant’s belief in conspiracy theories, while others tap into 
whatever variables the researcher hypothesises might explain the difference in susceptibility to 
conspiracy-based explanations. Statistical procedures are then used to assess the strength of the 
relationship between different variables, all with the view of uncovering factors that underpin the 
mind-set of the conspiracy theorist. 
In developing specific hypotheses about the kind of things that might account for the 
differences between believers and sceptics, researchers have tended to rely on the work of non-
psychologists, or in some cases simply on ‘intuition’ (Swami et al, 2010, p.752). For example, 
apart from exploring the relevance of more general demographic factors like gender, socio-
economic status, educational level, or ethnic background, psychologists have set out to test 
empirically a variety of assumptions which appear regularly in sociological literature. These 
include the claim that conspiracy theories provide a way of simplifying a complex world, that 
they offer a convenient scapegoat or an outlet for hostility, or that they reflect a more general 
distrust of authority. The fact that in the classic essay ‘The paranoid style in American politics’ 
Richard Hofstadter (1967) mentioned that people who feel alienated and powerless are 
particularly susceptible to conspiracist beliefs has led to ‘anomie’ becoming a ubiquitous 
variable in this strand of psychological research. The same applies to authoritarianism, which 
was linked to conspiracy theories in Adorno et al.’s (1950) The Authoritarian Personality. More 
recently, Swami et al. (2010) set out to explore also whether personality variables, such as 
Goldberg’s ‘Big Five’ personality traits might also account for individual differences in 
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conspiracy beliefs. Meanwhile, researchers interested in cognitive factors have explored issues 
such as people’s (lack of) awareness of their own susceptibility to conspiracy theories (Douglas 
and Sutton, 2008), whether or not conspiracy theorists exhibit a bias towards seeking big causes 
to explain big effects, or whether they are, for example susceptible to ‘biased assimilation’ – the 
tendency to uncritically accept evidence supporting a pre-existing view and reject disconfirming 
information (e.g. McCauley and Jacques, 1979, Butler et al., 1995, McHoskey, 1995, Leman and 
Cinnirella, 2007, Leman, 2007).  
Regardless of the specific focus of individual studies, the central tenet of this approach as 
a whole is that it conceptualises conspiracy theories as individual beliefs. Adherence to 
conspiracy-based explanations is seen as an aspect of individual differences and something that 
can be explained by reference to individual information processing biases, identity maintenance 
strategies or personality characteristics. The focus on the individual is reflected in the 
aforementioned use of attitude scales to tap into conspiracy beliefs. A number of such scales 
have emerged in recent years in the US (e.g. Goertzel, 1994, Abalakina-Paap et al, 1999), in the 
UK (Leman and Cinnirella, 2007, Swami et al. 2010), Poland (see Grzesiak-Feldman and 
Ejsmont, 2008, Kofta and Sędek, 2005), France (Wagner-Egger and Bangerter, 2007), Malaysia 
(Swami, 2012) and elsewhere. Some require respondents to rate the extent to which they believe 
specific conspiracy theories to be true (ranging from fluoridisation of water to the causes of 
9/11), while others contain more abstract questions about the role of conspiracies in world 
history. Regardless of the variations among them, their common aim is to produce a single score, 
which quantifies the extent to which an individual endorses conspiracy theories. 
In spite of an abundance of significant correlations reported in the studies, and the often 
impressive sounding results sections and abstracts, the ‘profile of the conspiracist individual’ has 
proven somewhat elusive. Studies that looked at cognitive, information-processing biases have 
only confirmed earlier conclusions that conspiracy theorists might not be as cognitively distinct 
as it is sometimes tempting to think (see Harrison and Thomas, 1997). Studies looking at social 
psychological factors have, on the other hand, produced largely inconsistent findings allowing 
only tentative conclusions. For example, some studies have found a positive correlation between 
conspiracy beliefs and authoritarianism (Abalakina-Paap et al, 1999, Grzesiak-Feldman and 
Irzycka, 2009); others found no correlation (McHoskey, 1995), while one recent study even 
suggested that people who are authoritarian have a greater tendency to be swayed by non-
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conspiratorial explanations (Swami et al, 2010). Similarly, while numerous studies have found a 
link between minority status and belief in conspiracy theories, the extent to which this 
relationship is mediated by socio-economic factors remains to be determined. In fact, the cynical 
view would be that the only consistent and robust finding yielded by the recent studies has been 
a rather obvious one, namely that conspiracy theorists are suspicious of mainstream explanations 
and resentful of conventional sources of authority.  
One could, of course, attribute this lack of clear findings to ‘teething problems’ faced by 
a young field of research, and argue that the situation will improve with the creation of more 
sophisticated measures, or with the development of more systematic research programmes that 
will use larger or more representative samples. And yet, there are precedents within social 
psychology that suggests that the problem might be more profound, and that the ‘optimistic 
notion of cumulative progress’ (Billig 1996, p.106) that underpins this kind of research might 
never be realised. Traditional psychological approaches to persuasion are a relevant example: for 
virtually every empirical finding that proposed a general rule of persuasion, there were myriad 
others that suggested some qualification, exception and exclusion. In the end, years of research 
and meticulous accumulation of evidence have produced little more than a ‘mass of unintegrated 
findings’ (Billig, 2003, p. 223). Thus, one might predict that with the development of the social 
psychology of conspiracy theories, the number of psychological factors correlated with 
conspiracy belief will expand, as will the number of variables that will be shown to mediate 
those correlations. However, as the number of relevant factors increases, the proportion of 
variance in conspiracy beliefs accounted for by each factor will inevitably diminish. With time, 
the complexity of the ‘psychological profile of conspiracist individual’ will undoubtedly grow, 
but this will only make it more, not less obscure and intangible.  
 
From attitude to ideological tradition 
 
One important feature of the emerging social psychology of conspiracy theories is that its 
approach to the topic is determined by the adherence to a specific methodology. At first sight, 
there is an obvious advantage to using questionnaires in this type of research, given their 
ubiquity in experimental social psychology generally.  Questionnaires are common in studies of, 
for example, religious and mystical beliefs or belief in the paranormal (e.g. Thalbourne, 1994, 
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see also Humphreys, 1995), or in studies of authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981).  In all of these 
contexts, questionnaires offer a practical solution to a problem faced by researchers interested in 
social phenomena, namely how to take a complex social issue and ‘tailor’ it into ‘experimental 
size’ (Graumann, 1987, p.245 ). Questionnaires are not only easy and cheap to administer to 
large samples, but they also offer a standardised, ‘objective’ way of measuring belief, one that 
enables findings of different studies to be meaningfully compared. From this perspective, the 
reductionism inherent in questionnaires becomes their greatest quality. Scales comprising fairly 
simple items, derived using procedures that promise reliability and validity, seek to reduce 
conspiracy theories to their bare essence, and condense them to a single and quantifiable measure 
of judgment.  
Even though Michael Billig’s writing on conspiracy theories predates the recent research 
by several decades, in it we find an important critique of the now dominant individual 
differences approach. In Fascists Billig (1978,p.314) argues that ‘when looking at the social 
psychological dynamics of so bizarre an outlook as the conspiracy theory, it is easy to 
overemphasise its eccentricities at the expense of noticing what it psychologically common 
place’. It is unnecessary, he argues, ‘to assume that the conspiracy theorist has a completely 
different cast of mind from the average person and that it must be described from a uniquely 
psychological perspective. History has shown that at times large numbers of both educated and 
uneducated people have embraced the conspiracy outlook’. For this reason, explaining what 
distinguishes believers from sceptics, might be far less important than accounting for how, why 
and when everyday thinking becomes contaminated by the characteristics of the ‘conspiracy 
mentality’. This is especially so given that belief in conspiracy theories tends to ebb and flow, 
with their popularity rising or falling in response to specific social conditions or political events 
(see Byford and Billig, 2001, also Byford, 2011).  
More fundamentally, for Billig, attitudes (and this includes the stance towards 
conspiracies and conspiracy theories) are never ‘merely expressions of the personality or the 
outer rumblings of the inner psyche’ (Billig, 1996, p. 256). They are always a stance in an 
argument, a position in a matter of controversy. Thus, people do not volunteer their opinion 
about a conspiracy theory through simple statements, akin to those used in attitude scales. The 
conspiracy theorist is always arguing against conventional explanations of politics, but also 
against other versions of the conspiracy theory (Billig, 1989). Talking about conspiracy theories 
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is therefore an act of advocacy, replete with arguments and counter-arguments, accusations and 
justifications. This argumentative, rhetorical dimension of the conspiracy theory is accentuated 
by the fact that conspiracy theorising is more often than not a shared endeavour and a social 
activity. It is performed through organisations, movements and campaigns, or increasingly 
through jointly produced websites and internet forums where claims and arguments are 
continuously exchanged, debated, evaluated and modified. One might go as far as to say that 
conspiracy theories are least interesting when they are viewed as, or reduced to, an aspect of a 
person’s mind or disposition. They are much more relevant as a dynamic set of ideas circulating 
in the public domain, an ideological discourse on the basis of which movements are established, 
political projects forged and power relations challenged and sustained. 
 The notion of ideology, or more precisely, ideological tradition lies at the core of 
Michael Billig’s approach to conspiracy theories (see especially Billig, 1988). As he rightly 
argues, there is much more to conspiracy theories than a simple attitudinal position, or the claim 
that an event in history was the outcome of collusion or a secret plot.  Anyone who has had the 
opportunity to engage with conspiracy theories about 9/11, the origins of AIDS or the 
machinations of the Bilderberg group, the Illuminati or Jews will have realised that conspiracy 
theories are also intricate and often enthralling stories.  What is more, a striking feature of 
conspiracy theories is that they often sound remarkably alike. Tales of conspiracy – whether 
expounded in London, Moscow, Teheran or Beijing – and regardless of whether they purport to 
explain a political assassination, the cause of a disease or a financial crisis are marked by a 
distinct thematic configuration, narrative structure and explanatory logic, as well as by the 
stubborn presence of a number of common motifs and tropes (see Billig, 1989, Byford 2011). 
American historian Richard Hofstadter referred to the common features of conspiracy theories as 
markers of a distinct, and robust explanatory or rhetorical ‘style’ which he chose to call 
‘paranoid’. He employed the term style, ‘much as a historian of art might speak of the baroque or 
the mannerist style. It is, above all, a way of seeing the world and of expressing oneself’ 
(Hofstadter, 1967, p.4).  
The rhetorical style and the explanatory logic of the conspiracy theory have also been 
shown to persist over time.  The worldview which defines contemporary conspiracy culture and 
the distinct manner of expression through which it is articulated, bears a close resemblance to 
that found in the writings of 19th and 20th century conspiracy theorists. Conspiracist 
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interpretations of the 2008 financial crisis draw on the same armoury of arguments and tropes 
which were used to interpret the Great Depression of the 1930s. The 9/11 Truth movement relies 
extensively on the interpretative framework established in the 1940s, when the opponents of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt accused him of allowing Pearl Harbour to happen in order to create a 
pretext for taking America to war. Throughout post-communist Eastern Europe, criticism 
directed at the supposedly seditious and sinister activities of western non-governmental 
organisations and human rights activists is similar to the late 18th and 19th century anti-
Illuminati and anti-Masonic rhetoric. These resemblances point to the fact that the rhetorical 
style of conspiracy theory forms part, of and helps to sustain, a distinct ideological tradition of 
explanation which dates back to the early, anti-Illuminati conspiracy treatises of Augustine 
Barruel and John Robison, published after the French Revolution (Roberts, 1974). This tradition 
consists of an evolving corpus of ideas, arguments, ‘facts’, ‘revelations’ and ‘proofs’ pertaining 
to the alleged world plot, which have been referred to, cited, quoted and perpetuated by 
successive generations of conspiracy theorists.  
The ideological tradition of the conspiracy theory is kept alive by the tendency among 
conspiracy writers to regurgitate, revamp and apply to new circumstances the body of 
knowledge, the explanatory logic and rhetorical tropes expounded in texts, books or pamphlets 
written and published by conspiracy theorists in the past (Byford and Billig, 2001). One reason 
for this is that conspiracy theorists always deal with imperfect evidence: they are concerned with 
matters that are inherently secret, and which the most powerful forces in the world are 
supposedly working hard to suppress. Because they cannot offer incontrovertible evidence for 
their claims, writers will tend to rely on the work of other conspiracy theorists, past and present, 
and invoke their authority as a substitute for direct proof. Furthermore, a conspiracy-based 
explanation of a significant political event cannot be reasonably conceived as historically 
isolated. The conspiracy theory is a view of the world not only as it is at present, but also as it 
always was. Hence, specific plots need to be, and invariably are, imagined as links in a longer 
chain of conspiracies. When locating current plots and schemes within the centuries-long line of 
conspiratorial activity, conspiracy theorists draw on the work of their predecessors and place 
their own discoveries and revelations about the present within a broader tradition of explanation 
(see Billig 1978 and Byford 2011 for a more detailed account of this dynamic).  
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Importantly however, the ideological nature of the conspiracy tradition does not mean 
that it is static or prescriptive. One of the central motifs of Billig’s writing on ideology (Billig, et 
al. 1988, Billig, 1990) is that ideology is not ‘a complete, unified system of beliefs which tells 
individuals how to think’. Rather, it involves arguments, debates and clashes which reflect it’s 
essentially ‘thinking nature’ (Billig, et al. 1988, p.2). Conspiracy theories are no different. In 
fact, the rhetorical and argumentative nature of conspiracism has been instrumental for its 
survival as an ideological tradition. The main force behind this permanent process of evolution 
and change has been the need to make conspiracy theories more plausible, acceptable, and 
pertinent in response to changing social and political circumstances. Conspiracy theorists are, 
and always have been surrounded by sceptics who place them under pressure to modify their 
theories in the direction of greater plausibility. The threat of ridicule, which has been hanging 
over purveyors of conspiracy theories from the outset, makes anticipating and reacting to 
potential or actual charges of irrationality, paranoia or prejudice, an essential feature of the 
conspiracy theorist’s endeavour. This is especially so given that conspiracy theorists always, if 
only implicitly, address an audience beyond the conspiracist community. They seek to convert 
the masses, but also to satisfy their need to be recognised by the very mainstream that they 
consistently reject and accuse of being in the pockets of powerful conspirators. The evolution of 
the conspiracy culture, therefore, entails the continuous creation of novel and more convincing 
ways of stating conspiratorial claims. Yet at the same time, the connection with the past persists, 
and is often manifested through no more than a loose pattern of ‘interpretative habits, implicit in 
a stream of assertions or arguments’ (Cubitt, 1993, p.2) or in barely noticeable, but ideologically 
significant ‘half-hinted allusions’ (Billig, 1988). 
The conceptualisation of the conspiracy theory as an evolving ideological tradition brings 
with it a different task for the scholar studying conspiracy theories. The focus is on locating 
specific explanations within the appropriate ideological and cultural context, scrutinising their 
logic and rhetoric against the backdrop of the broader historically situated patterns of thought, 
and analysing them as manifestations of a longer tradition of political explanation (see Billig, 
1988). The central difference between this approach and that found in contemporary social 
psychology is that the main object of analysis is not the individual mind or disposition of the 
theorist, but the theory itself and the social nature thought. For as Billig et al. (1988, p.2) point 
out, psychologists focusing on the mind-set of the individual ‘have been notably remiss in 
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examining how the processes of cultural and ideological history flow through the minds of their 
laboratory subjects’. Put differently, what is required is a shift towards a greater engagement 
with ‘the thinking society’ (Moscovici, 1984), and rather than looking for psychological 
underpinnings of social phenomena consider how historically situated ideologies, worldviews 
and cultural traditions produce and sustains particular patterns of thinking and behaviour.  
 
Between believers and sceptics: boundary markers of opinion 
 
A further advantage of the approach to conspiracy theories as an ideological tradition is 
that it moves away from the assumption implicit in questionnaire-based studies that engagement 
with conspiracy theories is reducible to the simple issue of a person’s latitude of acceptance and 
rejection (Billig, 1987). This is important because what makes conspiracy theories so prevalent 
in modern society is precisely the fact that they are not confined to a narrow category of firm 
believers (‘conspiracist individuals’), sealed off from the mainstream by a set of dispositional 
characteristics or the adherence to a dysfunctional cognitive style. Conspiracy theories, as social 
beliefs, are sustained also by the notion that while conspiracy based explanations might not be 
true, they nevertheless constitute a legitimate view for people to hold. This position, which is 
often espoused by mainstream publishers, sections of the media and public figures with little 
history of adherence to conspiracism is completely sidestepped in the recent psychological 
research. And yet, it is crucial because it helps foster a ‘climate of opinion about the boundaries 
between acceptable and nonacceptable opinion’ (Billig, 1987, p.133). What is more, it does so in 
way that gives conspiracy theories an air of respectability, and converts a matter of established 
historical fact into a matter of opinion and belief. An awareness of the shifting boundary markers 
of opinion, and the exploration of the discursive and ideological dynamic behind this process is 
crucial for understanding the continuing appeal of conspiracy theories and the ways in which the 
images, motifs and assumptions which are rooted in the conspiracy tradition become part of the 
shared knowledge and beliefs, which people draw upon as they make sense of events around 
them. 
Related to the issue of boundary markers of opinion is a recent development in 
conspiratorial rhetoric, namely the tendency among conspiracy theorists to articulate their 
position in the form of a question (see Aaronovitch, 2008, Byford 2011). Rather than purporting 
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to have a definitive answer about the causes of an event or a series of events, conspiracy theorists 
will claim to be ‘merely’ posing a set of questions. They will usually hint at some inadequacy in 
the official non-conspiratorial explanation, and call for a ‘rational’ and ‘informed’ debate in a 
ways that alludes to a hidden ‘truth’ that is yet to be uncovered or demonstrated. However, as I 
have argued elsewhere (Byford, 2011), the motif of ‘just asking questions’ is rhetorically 
designed to open up the space for conspiracy theories while allowing those asking the questions 
to retain the aura of respectability. Furthermore, the ‘”it is not a theory” theory’ (Aaronovitch, 
2008) shifts the burden of proof onto the sceptics and seeks to cajole the mainstream into a 
‘debate’ with the conspiracy theorist, which invariably enhances the latter’s status and esteem.  
In the context of the argument presented in this chapter, what is especially important 
about this relatively new development in conspiracist rhetoric is that it exposes another important 
limitation of the questionnaire approach adopted in much of the recent social psychological 
literature. When completing a ‘belief in conspiracy theories’ scale, the conspiracy theorist of the 
‘I am just asking questions’ kind could quite plausibly claim to be ‘undecided’ about various 
conspiracy claims, such as whether the US government caused 9/11, whether mafia killed JFK, 
or whether or not Barack Obama was born on US soil. As a consequence, they would obtain a 
moderate score, and inevitably slip under the radar of the researchers. This is yet another 
illustration of the necessity to move away from the simple notion of belief, and embrace the 
study of conspiracy theories as a dynamic yet historically contingent set of arguments, images 
and interpretations which are flexibly drawn upon, modified, debated and applied to novel 
circumstances in the course of the on-going, everyday sense-making practices.   
  
Conspiracy theories and critical scholarship 
Finally, there is an additional reason why Michael Billig’s approach to conspiracy 
theories is important. Contemporary mainstream social psychology exhibits a surprising 
tendency to treat conspiracy theories as ideologically neutral, sometimes even with sympathetic 
understanding. Although authors typically acknowledge the dangers posed by AIDS denialism or 
conspiracy theories which target Jews or Muslims, they treat conspiracy theories generally with 
less disdain. For example, it is not uncommon to find claims that because conspiracies do 
happen, at least some conspiracy theorists might be onto something (e.g. French and Brotherton, 
2011, Douglas, 2011, Douglas and Sutton, 2011, Swami and Coles, 2010). Writers will also 
13 
 
sometimes explicitly warn against using ‘pejorative terms’ when talking of conspiracy theorists 
(French and Brotherton, 2011), or they will simply refuse to get involved in the discussion about 
whether a particular conspiracy theory is true. As Karen Douglas (2011) put it recently, her 
concern ‘as a psychologist’ is not whether conspiracy theories are ‘true or false’ but ‘simply’ 
why people believe certain explanations that are not accepted by the mainstream. In a few cases, 
authors have gone as far as to suggest that conspiracist ideas possess some ‘positive aspects’ 
such as ‘providing alternative histories in periods of declining faith in traditional authorities’ 
(Swami et al, 2010, p.751).   
This stance of political ‘neutrality’ is made possible by the researchers’ general 
reluctance to engage with conspiracy theories themselves, with their ideological dimensions and 
historical legacy. Conspiracy theory as a specific tradition of explanation should not be confused 
with the broader discourses of suspicion (the so-called ‘routinised paranoia’, see Knight, 2000, 
p.73) which permeate modern society, or with enquiries into genuine instances of corruption or 
cover-up (for a detailed account of this distinction see Byford, 2011). Especially as, for the past 
two centuries, conspiracy theories have played a notable role in shaping public perceptions of 
history and politics, and have done so all too often as a feature of political ideologies and 
projects whose role in history has been far from positive. Conspiracism has been the staple 
ingredient of discriminatory, anti-democratic and populist politics and a trademark of the rhetoric 
of oppressive regimes (see especially Cohn, 1967). This is a legacy that conspiracy theories have 
not been able to shake off (Billig, 1978). What is more, the irrefutable logic of conspiracy 
theories gives them a distinct self-isolating quality. Conspiracy theories can only lead to more 
conspiracy theories, and never to genuine solutions to social problems. For that reason alone they 
cannot be ideologically neutral.  
Michael Billig’s approach to conspiracy theories contains within it an explicit critique of 
the kind of the detachment encountered in contemporary writing on conspiracy theories. As 
Billig argued in a somewhat different context, social psychology, especially when it deals with 
ideological phenomena, must always seek to combine empirical enquiry with social critique. The 
researcher’s task is not to be neutral or to shun controversy, but on the contrary, to ‘find out 
which beliefs are worthy of respect, and which are not’ (Billig, 1979, p. 427). Nowhere is this 
more relevant than in the case of conspiracy theories. The main legacy of Billig’s work is that it 
14 
 
not only demonstrates why this is so, but also shows how to do a socially committed social 
psychology of conspiracy theories. 
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i The discussion in this chapter will remain confined to research which belongs to the domain of 
traditional, experimental social psychology. For an overview and critique of the recent literature 
which examines conspiracy beliefs through the lens of psychoanalytic theory or in terms of 
‘paranoid cognition’, see Byford (2011).  
